I argue against sceptical invariantism on the grounds that, in common with a number of contemporary proposals in this regard, it misdiagnoses the source of radical scepticism. The nub of the matter is that the problem of radical scepticism does not essentially trade on an appeal to an austere epistemic standard for knowledge as sceptical invariantism supposes; indeed, the putative radical sceptical paradox is no less troubling if we stipulate that the operative epistemic standard for knowledge is very undemanding. As I explain, the idea that the source of radical scepticism concerns epistemic standards in this way pervades the recent treatment of this problem, and hence understanding where sceptical invariantism goes awry casts light on the wider contemporary debate about radical scepticism.
|Title of host publication||Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered |
|Editors||Christos Kyriacou, Kevin Wallbridge|
|ISBN (Print)||9780367370183 |
|Publication status||Accepted/In press - 28 May 2020|
|Name||Routledge Studies in Epistemology|