Skeptical invariantism and the source of skepticism

Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

I argue against sceptical invariantism on the grounds that, in common with a number of contemporary proposals in this regard, it misdiagnoses the source of radical scepticism. The nub of the matter is that the problem of radical scepticism does not essentially trade on an appeal to an austere epistemic standard for knowledge as sceptical invariantism supposes; indeed, the putative radical sceptical paradox is no less troubling if we stipulate that the operative epistemic standard for knowledge is very undemanding. As I explain, the idea that the source of radical scepticism concerns epistemic standards in this way pervades the recent treatment of this problem, and hence understanding where sceptical invariantism goes awry casts light on the wider contemporary debate about radical scepticism.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSkeptical Invariantism Reconsidered
EditorsChristos Kyriacou, Kevin Wallbridge
PublisherRoutledge
Edition1st
ISBN (Print)9780367370183
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 28 May 2020

Publication series

NameRoutledge Studies in Epistemology
PublisherRoutledge

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