Social epistemology and the acquisition of understanding

Emma Gordon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Contemporary discussions of testimony in social epistemology have traditionally focused on how epistemic justication and especially propositional knowledge can pass from speaker to hearer. By contrast, objectual understanding – i.e. the kind of epistemic standing one attains when one understands a subject matter or body of information – has for the most part been ignored entirely in these debates. This is surprising, in part, because recent literature on epistemic value (e.g. Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2010; Riggs 2009) has witnessed increased attention to understanding and the kind of purely epistemic value it might have, and which knowledge by contrast lacks. If this line in the epistemic value literature is right, the acquisition of understanding in social epistemic practice should be at least as important a topic of study as the social acquisition of knowledge.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationExplaining Understanding
Subtitle of host publicationNew Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
EditorsS Grimm, C Baumberger, S Ammon
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherRoutledge
Pages293-317
Edition1
ISBN (Electronic)9781317414179
ISBN (Print)9781138921931
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 14 Oct 2016

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