Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study

Chulyoung Kim; Sang-Hyun Kim; Jinhyuk Lee; Joosung Lee

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219

Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study

Chulyoung Kim, Sang-Hyun Kim, Jinhyuk Lee, Joosung Lee

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non- veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power.

Original language	English
Article number	102219
Journal	European Journal of Political Economy
Volume	75
Early online date	7 May 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219
Publication status	Published - Dec 2022

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

game theory
coalition bargaining
veto game
experiment
non-core allocation
intermediate coalition formation

Access to Document

10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219

LeeEtalEJPE2022StrategicAlliancesInAVetoGameAccepted author manuscript, 965 KBLicence: Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC BY-NC-ND)

1 Working paper

Strategic Alliances in a Veto Game: An Experimental Study
Lee, J., Kim, C., Kim, S-H. & Lee, J., 2022, (Accepted/In press) Elsevier.
Research output: Working paper

Cite this

@article{70b8bf1e7ec34f3b8cf4cd8071e7e598,

title = "Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study",

abstract = "In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non- veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power.",

keywords = "game theory, coalition bargaining, veto game, experiment, non-core allocation, intermediate coalition formation",

author = "Chulyoung Kim and Sang-Hyun Kim and Jinhyuk Lee and Joosung Lee",

note = "Funding Information: We are grateful to the editor and two referees for their valuable comments that substantially improved our paper. We are also thankful to Syngjoo Choi, Subhasish Chowdhury, Daeyoung Jeong, Duk Gyoo Kim, Semin Kim, Jaeok Park, Euncheol Shin, and seminar participants at Yonsei University for valuable comments. All remaining errors are our own. This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2018 ( RMS2 2018-22-0088 ) and Korea University Grant ( K1720421 ). Funding Information: This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2018 ( RMS2 2018-22-0088 ) and Korea University Grant ( K172042 ). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2022",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219",

language = "English",

volume = "75",

journal = "European Journal of Political Economy",

issn = "0176-2680",

publisher = "Elsevier",

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T1 - Strategic alliances in a veto game

T2 - An experimental study

AU - Kim, Chulyoung

AU - Kim, Sang-Hyun

AU - Lee, Jinhyuk

AU - Lee, Joosung

N1 - Funding Information: We are grateful to the editor and two referees for their valuable comments that substantially improved our paper. We are also thankful to Syngjoo Choi, Subhasish Chowdhury, Daeyoung Jeong, Duk Gyoo Kim, Semin Kim, Jaeok Park, Euncheol Shin, and seminar participants at Yonsei University for valuable comments. All remaining errors are our own. This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2018 ( RMS2 2018-22-0088 ) and Korea University Grant ( K1720421 ). Funding Information: This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2018 ( RMS2 2018-22-0088 ) and Korea University Grant ( K172042 ). Publisher Copyright: © 2022 Elsevier B.V.

PY - 2022/12

Y1 - 2022/12

N2 - In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non- veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power.

AB - In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non- veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power.

KW - game theory

KW - coalition bargaining

KW - veto game

KW - experiment

KW - non-core allocation

KW - intermediate coalition formation

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219

DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219

M3 - Article

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VL - 75

JO - European Journal of Political Economy

JF - European Journal of Political Economy

M1 - 102219

ER -

Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study

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Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

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Research output

Strategic Alliances in a Veto Game: An Experimental Study

Cite this