Strategic observational learning

Research output: Working paperPreprint

Abstract / Description of output

We study learning by privately informed forward-looking agents in a simple repeated-action setting of social learning. Under a symmetric signal structure, forward-looking agents behave myopically for any degrees of patience. Myopic equilibrium is unique in the class of symmetric threshold strategies, and the simplest symmetric non-monotonic strategies. If the signal structure is asymmetric and the game is infinite, there is no equilibrium in myopic strategies, for any positive degree of patience.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherSocial Science Research Network (SSRN)
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 9 Jan 2023

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • learning
  • agreement
  • information aggregation


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