Strategic observational learning

Dimitri Migrow

doi:10.2139/ssrn.4319159

Strategic observational learning

Dimitri Migrow

School of Economics

Research output: Working paper › Preprint

Abstract

We study learning by privately informed forward-looking agents in a simple repeated-action setting of social learning. Under a symmetric signal structure, forward-looking agents behave myopically for any degrees of patience. Myopic equilibrium is unique in the class of symmetric threshold strategies, and the simplest symmetric non-monotonic strategies. If the signal structure is asymmetric and the game is infinite, there is no equilibrium in myopic strategies, for any positive degree of patience.

Original language	English
Publisher	Social Science Research Network (SSRN)
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4319159
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 9 Jan 2023

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

learning
agreement
information aggregation

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10.2139/ssrn.4319159

MigrowSSRN2023StrategicObservationalLearningSubmitted manuscript, 503 KB

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Strategic observational learning

Abstract

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

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Cite this