Abstract
Background: To mitigate SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks from international air travellers, many countries implemented a combination of up to 14 days of self-quarantine upon arrival plus PCR testing in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Aim: To assess the effectiveness of quarantine and testing of international travellers to reduce risk of onward SARS-CoV-2 transmission into a destination country in the pre-COVID-19 vaccination era. Methods: We used a simulation model of air travellers arriving in the United Kingdom from the European Union or the United States, incorporating timing of infection stages while varying quarantine duration and timing and number of PCR tests. Results: Quarantine upon arrival with a PCR test on day 7 plus a 1-day delay for results can reduce the number of infectious arriving travellers released into the community by a median 94% (95% uncertainty interval (UI): 89–98) compared with a no quarantine/no test scenario. This reduction is similar to that achieved by a 14-day quarantine period (median>99%; 95% UI: 98–100). Even shorter quarantine periods can prevent a substantial amount of transmission; all strategies in which travellers spend at least 5 days (mean incubation period) in quarantine and have at least one negative test before release are highly effective (median reduction 89%; 95% UI: 83–95)). Conclusion: The effect of different screening strategies impacts asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals differently. The choice of an optimal quarantine and testing strategy for unvaccinated air travellers may vary based on the number of possible imported infections relative to domestic incidence.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Article number | 2001440 |
Journal | Eurosurveillance |
Volume | 26 |
Issue number | 39 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 30 Sept 2021 |
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In: Eurosurveillance, Vol. 26, No. 39, 2001440, 30.09.2021.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategies to reduce the risk of SARS-CoV-2 importation from international travellers
T2 - Modelling estimations for the United Kingdom, July 2020
AU - Clifford, Samuel
AU - Quilty, Billy J.
AU - Russell, Timothy W.
AU - Liu, Yang
AU - Chan, Yung Wai D.
AU - Pearson, Carl A.B.
AU - Eggo, Rosalind M.
AU - Endo, Akira
AU - CMMID COVID-19 Working Group
AU - Flasche, Stefan
AU - John Edmunds, W.
AU - Sherratt, Katharine
AU - Hué, Stéphane
AU - Quaife, Matthew
AU - Bosse, Nikos I.
AU - Medley, Graham
AU - Auzenbergs, Megan
AU - Kucharski, Adam J.
AU - Davies, Nicholas G.
AU - Brady, Oliver
AU - Meakin, Sophie R.
AU - Houben, Rein M.G.J.
AU - Atkins, Katherine E.
AU - Prem, Kiesha
AU - Villabona-Arenas, C. Julian
AU - Gibbs, Hamish P.
AU - Jombart, Thibaut
AU - Diamond, Charlie
AU - Klepac, Petra
AU - Deol, Arminder K.
AU - Lowe, Rachel
AU - Rudge, James W.
AU - Jit, Mark
AU - Funk, Sebastian
AU - Knight, Gwenan M.
AU - Procter, Simon R.
AU - Simons, David
AU - Leclerc, Quentin J.
AU - Munday, James D.
AU - Gimma, Amy
AU - Gore-Langton, Georgia R.
AU - Jarvis, Christopher I.
AU - Emery, Jon C.
AU - Foss, Anna M.
AU - O’Reilly, Kathleen
AU - Hellewell, Joel
AU - Nightingale, Emily S.
AU - van Zandvoort, Kevin
AU - Tully, Damien C.
AU - Abbott, Sam
AU - Abbas, Kaja
AU - Sun, Fiona Yueqian
AU - Rosello, Alicia
N1 - Funding Information: Funding: The following funding sources are acknowledged as providing funding for the named authors. This research was partly funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (INV-003174: YL; NTD Modelling Consortium OPP1184344: CABP). DFID/Wellcome Trust (Epidemic Preparedness Coronavirus research programme 221303/Z/20/Z: CABP). This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme - project EpiPose (101003688: WJE, YL). HDR UK (MR/S003975/1: RME). This research was partly funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) using UK aid from the UK Government to support global health research. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NIHR or the UK Department of Health and Social Care (16/136/46: BJQ; 16/137/109: BJQ, YL; PR-OD-1017-20002: WJE). UK MRC (MC_PC_19065 - Covid 19: Understanding the dynamics and drivers of the COVID-19 epidemic using real-time outbreak analytics: RME, SC, WJE, YL). Wellcome Trust (206250/Z/17/Z: TWR; 208812/Z/17/Z: SC, SFlasche). The Alan Turing Institute and The Nakajima Foundation (AE). No funding (YWDC). Funding Information: The following funding sources are acknowledged as providing funding for the named authors. This research was partly funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (INV-003174: YL; NTD Modelling Consortium OPP1184344: CABP). DFID/Wellcome Trust (Epidemic Preparedness Coronavirus research programme 221303/Z/20/Z: CABP). This project has received funding from the European Union?s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme - project EpiPose (101003688: WJE, YL). HDR UK (MR/S003975/1: RME). This research was partly funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) using UK aid from the UK Government to support global health research. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NIHR or the UK Department of Health and Social Care (16/136/46: BJQ; 16/137/109: BJQ, YL; PR-OD-1017-20002: WJE). UK MRC (MC_PC_19065 - Covid 19: Understanding the dynamics and drivers of the COVID-19 epidemic using real-time outbreak analytics: RME, SC, WJE, YL). Wellcome Trust (206250/Z/17/Z: TWR; 208812/Z/17/Z: SC, SFlasche). The Alan Turing Institute and The Nakajima Foundation (AE). No funding (YWDC). The following funding sources are acknowledged as providing funding for the working group authors. BBSRC LIDP (BB/M009513/1: DS). This research was partly funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (INV-001754: MQ; INV-003174: KP, MJ; NTD Modelling Consortium OPP1184344: GM; OPP1180644: SRP; OPP1183986: ESN; OPP1191821: KO?R, MA). BMGF (OPP1157270: KA). DFID/Wellcome Trust (Epidemic Preparedness Coronavirus research programme 221303/Z/20/Z: KvZ). DTRA (HDTRA1-18-1-0051: JWR). Elrha R2HC/UK DFID/Wellcome Trust/This research was partly funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) using UK aid from the UK Government to support global health research. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NIHR or the UK Department of Health and Social Care (KvZ). ERC Starting Grant (#757688: CJVA, KEA; #757699: JCE, MQ, RMGJH). This project has received funding from the European Union?s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme - project EpiPose (101003688: KP, MJ, PK). This research was partly funded by the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) project ?RECAP? managed through RCUK and ESRC (ES/P010873/1: AG, CIJ, TJ). NIHR (16/137/109: CD, FYS, MJ; Health Protection Research Unit for Immunisation NIHR200929: NGD; Health Protection Research Unit for Modelling Methodology HPRU-2012-10096: TJ; NIHR200929: MJ; PR-OD-1017-20002: AR). Royal Society (Dorothy Hodgkin Fellowship: RL; RP\EA\180004: PK). UK DHSC/UK Aid/NIHR (ITCRZ 03010: HPG). UK MRC (LID DTP MR/N013638/1: GRGL, QJL; MC_PC_19065 - Covid 19: Understanding the dynamics and drivers of the COVID-19 epidemic using real-time outbreak analytics: AG, NGD, TJ; MR/P014658/1: GMK). Authors of this research receive funding from UK Public Health Rapid Support Team funded by the United Kingdom Department of Health and Social Care (TJ). Wellcome Trust (206250/Z/17/Z: AJK; 206471/Z/17/Z: OJB; 210758/Z/18/Z: JDM, JH, KS, NIB, SA, SFunk, SRM). No funding (AKD, AMF, DCT, SH). Funding Information: The following funding sources are acknowledged as providing funding for the working group authors. BBSRC LIDP (BB/M009513/1: DS). This research was partly funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (INV-001754: MQ; INV-003174: KP, MJ; NTD Modelling Consortium OPP1184344: GM; OPP1180644: SRP; OPP1183986: ESN; OPP1191821: KO’R, MA). BMGF (OPP1157270: KA). DFID/Wellcome Trust (Epidemic Preparedness Coronavirus research programme 221303/Z/20/Z: KvZ). DTRA (HDTRA1-18-1-0051: JWR). Elrha R2HC/UK DFID/Wellcome Trust/This research was partly funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) using UK aid from the UK Government to support global health research. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NIHR or the UK Department of Health and Social Care (KvZ). ERC Starting Grant (#757688: CJVA, KEA; #757699: JCE, MQ, RMGJH). This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme - project EpiPose (101003688: KP, MJ, PK). This research was partly funded by the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) project ‘RECAP’ managed through RCUK and ESRC (ES/P010873/1: AG, CIJ, TJ). NIHR (16/137/109: CD, FYS, MJ; Health Protection Research Unit for Immunisation NIHR200929: NGD; Health Protection Research Unit for Modelling Methodology HPRU-2012-10096: TJ; NIHR200929: MJ; PR-OD-1017-20002: AR). Royal Society (Dorothy Hodgkin Fellowship: RL; RP\EA\180004: PK). UK DHSC/UK Aid/NIHR (ITCRZ 03010: HPG). UK MRC (LID DTP MR/N013638/1: GRGL, QJL; MC_PC_19065 - Covid 19: Understanding the dynamics and drivers of the COVID-19 epidemic using real-time outbreak analytics: AG, NGD, TJ; MR/P014658/1: GMK). Authors of this research receive funding from UK Public Health Rapid Support Team funded by the United Kingdom Department of Health and Social Care (TJ). Wellcome Trust (206250/Z/17/Z: AJK; 206471/Z/17/Z: OJB; 210758/Z/18/Z: JDM, JH, KS, NIB, SA, SFunk, SRM). No funding (AKD, AMF, DCT, SH). Publisher Copyright: © 2021 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). All rights reserved.
PY - 2021/9/30
Y1 - 2021/9/30
N2 - Background: To mitigate SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks from international air travellers, many countries implemented a combination of up to 14 days of self-quarantine upon arrival plus PCR testing in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Aim: To assess the effectiveness of quarantine and testing of international travellers to reduce risk of onward SARS-CoV-2 transmission into a destination country in the pre-COVID-19 vaccination era. Methods: We used a simulation model of air travellers arriving in the United Kingdom from the European Union or the United States, incorporating timing of infection stages while varying quarantine duration and timing and number of PCR tests. Results: Quarantine upon arrival with a PCR test on day 7 plus a 1-day delay for results can reduce the number of infectious arriving travellers released into the community by a median 94% (95% uncertainty interval (UI): 89–98) compared with a no quarantine/no test scenario. This reduction is similar to that achieved by a 14-day quarantine period (median>99%; 95% UI: 98–100). Even shorter quarantine periods can prevent a substantial amount of transmission; all strategies in which travellers spend at least 5 days (mean incubation period) in quarantine and have at least one negative test before release are highly effective (median reduction 89%; 95% UI: 83–95)). Conclusion: The effect of different screening strategies impacts asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals differently. The choice of an optimal quarantine and testing strategy for unvaccinated air travellers may vary based on the number of possible imported infections relative to domestic incidence.
AB - Background: To mitigate SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks from international air travellers, many countries implemented a combination of up to 14 days of self-quarantine upon arrival plus PCR testing in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Aim: To assess the effectiveness of quarantine and testing of international travellers to reduce risk of onward SARS-CoV-2 transmission into a destination country in the pre-COVID-19 vaccination era. Methods: We used a simulation model of air travellers arriving in the United Kingdom from the European Union or the United States, incorporating timing of infection stages while varying quarantine duration and timing and number of PCR tests. Results: Quarantine upon arrival with a PCR test on day 7 plus a 1-day delay for results can reduce the number of infectious arriving travellers released into the community by a median 94% (95% uncertainty interval (UI): 89–98) compared with a no quarantine/no test scenario. This reduction is similar to that achieved by a 14-day quarantine period (median>99%; 95% UI: 98–100). Even shorter quarantine periods can prevent a substantial amount of transmission; all strategies in which travellers spend at least 5 days (mean incubation period) in quarantine and have at least one negative test before release are highly effective (median reduction 89%; 95% UI: 83–95)). Conclusion: The effect of different screening strategies impacts asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals differently. The choice of an optimal quarantine and testing strategy for unvaccinated air travellers may vary based on the number of possible imported infections relative to domestic incidence.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85117224245&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2021.26.39.2001440
DO - 10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2021.26.39.2001440
M3 - Article
C2 - 34596018
AN - SCOPUS:85117224245
SN - 1560-7917
VL - 26
JO - Eurosurveillance
JF - Eurosurveillance
IS - 39
M1 - 2001440
ER -