Strong Enforcement by a Weak Authority

Jakub Steiner

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper


This paper studies the enforcement abilities of authorities with a limited commitment to punishing violators. Commitment of resources sufficient to punish only one agent is needed to enforce high compliance of an arbitrary number of agents. Though existence of other, non-compliance equilibria is generally inevitable, there exist punishment rules suitable for a limited authority to assure that compliance prevails in the long run under stochastic evolution.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEdinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Number of pages15
Publication statusPublished - 17 Feb 2006

Publication series

NameESE Discussion Papers


  • commitment
  • enforcement
  • punishment
  • stochastic evolution
  • C73
  • D64
  • H41


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