Structural estimation of a model of school choices: The Boston mechanism versus its alternatives

Caterina Calsamiglia, Chao Fu, Maia Guell

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types, using administrative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM in Barcelona to the deferred-acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfare by €1,020, while a change to the top-trading-cycles mechanism would increase average welfare by €460.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)642-680
Number of pages39
JournalJournal of Political Economy
Volume128
Issue number2
Early online date27 Dec 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 28 Feb 2020

Keywords

  • Boston mechanism

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Structural estimation of a model of school choices: The Boston mechanism versus its alternatives'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this