Abstract
In order to accommodate his view that quantifiers are predicates of predicates within a type theory, Frege introduces a rule which allows a function name to be formed by removing a saturated name from another saturated name which contains it. This rule requires that each name has a rather rich syntactic structure, since one must be able to recognize the occurrences of a name in a larger name. However, I argue that Frege is unable to account for this syntactic structure. I argue that this problem undermines the inductive portion of Frege's proof that all of the names of his system denote in 29-32 of The Basic Laws.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 253-277 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic |
Volume | 51 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- philosophy of logic
- Frege's proof of referentiality