@techreport{a44c050f2ca746a8ab661727bc3ac2c4,
title = "Temporary Alliance Formation: Endogenous Sequencing in Conflict Games",
abstract = "We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and , in case they win, later they fifht it out among themselves.",
author = "J. Esteban and J. Sakovics",
year = "2000",
language = "English",
series = "Papers",
publisher = "El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza",
}