Tenable threats when Nash Equilibrium is the norm

Jozsef Sakovics, Françoise Forges

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract / Description of output

We formally assume that players in a game consider Nash Equilibrium (NE) the behavioral norm. In finite games of perfect information this leads to a refinement of NE: Faithful Nash Equilibrium (FNE). FNE is outcome equivalent to NE of the "trimmed" game, obtained by restricting the original tree to its NE paths. Thus, it always exists but it need not be unique. Iterating the norm ensures uniqueness of outcome. FNE may violate backward induction when subgame perfection requires play according to the SPE following a deviation from it. We thus provide an alternative view of tenable threats in equilibrium analysis.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEdinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh
Number of pages21
Publication statusPublished - 11 Jun 2021

Publication series

NameEdinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series


Dive into the research topics of 'Tenable threats when Nash Equilibrium is the norm'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this