Testing the participation constraint in the executive labour market

Ian Gregory-Smith, Brian Main

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper examines the workings of the executive labour market in a panel of
UK listed companies. Directors are found to move jobs regularly - both within
companies and between companies. Consistent with an active labour market,
directors who are underpaid relative to their comparable peers are particularly
likely to leave for higher paying jobs in other companies. Those who move between
companies secure more favourable terms than those who move within their firm
- even when the move does not involve promotion. The evidence suggests that
market forces, while far from the only consideration, do need to be incorporated
into explanations of this sector of the labour market.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)399-426
Number of pages28
JournalScottish Journal of Political Economy
Volume63
Issue number4
Early online date19 Oct 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2016

Keywords

  • Exectuive pay, labour market, participation, managerial power

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Testing the participation constraint in the executive labour market'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this