The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations and Equilibria

Haris Aziz, Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract / Description of output

The Adjusted Winner procedure is an important mechanism proposed by Brams and Taylor for fairly allocating goods between two agents. It has been used in practice for divorce settlements and analyzing political disputes. Assuming truthful declaration of the valuations, it computes an allocation that is envy-free, equitable and Pareto optimal. We show that Adjusted Winner admits several elegant characterizations, which further shed light on the outcomes reached with strategic agents. We find that the procedure may not admit pure Nash equilibria in either the discrete or continuous variants, but is guaranteed to have ε-Nash equilibria for each ε > 0. Moreover, under informed tie-breaking, exact pure Nash equilibria always exist, are Pareto optimal, and their social welfare is at least 3/4 of the optimal.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Place of PublicationPalo Alto, California USA
PublisherAAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages454-460
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-57735-738-4
Publication statusPublished - 31 Jul 2015
Event24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2015 - Buenos Aires, Argentina
Duration: 25 Jul 201531 Jul 2015
https://ijcai-15.org/

Conference

Conference24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2015
Abbreviated titleIJCAI 2015
Country/TerritoryArgentina
CityBuenos Aires
Period25/07/1531/07/15
Internet address

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations and Equilibria'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this