@techreport{5e8802eb70fc4d5faf638400b87972ba,
title = "The Case for a Discriminatory Pricing Rule in Competitive Electricity Pools",
abstract = "We present a multi-unit common value auction model with capacity constraints which ensure the participants face a residual market. We show that a discriminatory auction performs better than a uniform one when such constraints are present. We then look at a more explicit model of electricity pools and show that the preferred uniform pricing rule can lead to equilibria that are even worse than the basic model suggests. We show that a discriminatory auction would lead to relatively more competitive prices.",
keywords = "electricity pool, multi-unit auction",
author = "Ahmed Anwar",
year = "2004",
month = apr,
language = "English",
series = "ESE Discussion Papers",
publisher = "Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh",
}