The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control

Aristotelis Boukouras, Emre Aytimur, Robert Schwager

Research output: Working paper

Abstract / Description of output

We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when
the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and
an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ
significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates' policies, both
ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median
voters' ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is
imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • elections
  • polarization
  • strategic delegation
  • bureaucracy
  • foreign influence

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