Abstract
We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when
the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and
an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ
significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates' policies, both
ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median
voters' ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is
imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.
the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and
an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ
significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates' policies, both
ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median
voters' ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is
imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- elections
- polarization
- strategic delegation
- bureaucracy
- foreign influence