Abstract
We resolve the complexity of revenue-optimal deterministic auctions in the unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian setting, i.e., the optimal item pricing problem, when the buyer's values for the items are independent. We show that the problem of computing a revenue-optimal pricing can be solved in polynomial time for distributions of support size 2 and its decision version is NP-complete for distributions of support size 3. We also show that the problem remains NP-complete for the case of identical distributions.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms |
Pages | 1319-1328 |
Number of pages | 10 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 978-1-61197-340-2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2014 |