Abstract / Description of output
This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during
the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or
policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this
potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains
after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the
incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing
reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages
that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages.
Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications
of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and
popular assemblies on electoral competition.
the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or
policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this
potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains
after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the
incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing
reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages
that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages.
Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications
of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and
popular assemblies on electoral competition.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series |
| Number of pages | 32 |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2010 |
Publication series
| Name | ESE Discussion Papers |
|---|---|
| No. | 194 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- incumbency advantage
- referenda
- popular initiatives
- elections
- D7
- H1