The fantasy of third-person science: Phenomenology, ontology and evidence

Shannon Vallor*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Dennett's recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states. By employing Husserl's philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications of this relationship for the empirical identification of 'real' conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences Dennett's method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-15
Number of pages15
JournalPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume8
Issue number1
Early online date3 Jun 2008
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2009

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • heterophenomenology
  • naturalism
  • ontology
  • phenomenology
  • scientific evidence

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