Abstract / Description of output
The Fisher market model is one of the most fundamental resource allocation models in economics. In a Fisher market, the prices and allocations of goods are determined according to the preferences and budgets of buyers to clear the market. In a Fisher market game, however, buyers are strategic and report their preferences over goods; the market-clearing prices and allocations are then determined based on their reported preferences rather than their real preferences. We show that the Fisher market game always has a pure Nash equilibrium, for buyers with linear, Leontief, and Cobb-Douglas utility functions, which are three representative classes of utility functions in the important Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) family. Furthermore, to quantify the social efficiency, we prove Price of Anarchy bounds for the game when the utility functions of buyers fall into these three classes respectively.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of The Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
| Place of Publication | Palo Alto, California, USA |
| Publisher | AAAI Press |
| Pages | 587-593 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Volume | 28 (1) |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-1-57735-661-5 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 21 Jun 2014 |
| Event | The 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014 - Québec City, Canada Duration: 27 Jul 2014 → 31 Jul 2014 Conference number: 28 https://www.aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI/aaai14.php |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
|---|---|
| Publisher | AAAI Press |
| Number | 1 |
| Volume | 28 |
| ISSN (Print) | 2159-5399 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 2374-3468 |
Conference
| Conference | The 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014 |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | AAAI 2014 |
| Country/Territory | Canada |
| City | Québec City |
| Period | 27/07/14 → 31/07/14 |
| Internet address |