Abstract / Description of output
Courts use inferences to the best explanation in many contexts and for a variety of purposes. Yet our understanding of lawyers’ uses of this inferential form is insufficient. In this article, after briefly introducing this inferential form, I set out (i) to explain the structure of such arguments by reference to an argument scheme; (ii) to clarify the types of claims courts support by deploying such inferences while attempting to justify acting in accordance with explanatory principles (inferences I shall refer to as IBE-P); (iii) to offer an account of the “explanatory” relationship on which IBE-P is predicated; (iv) to explain what precisely can count as part of the explanandum in an IBE-P and, finally (v) discuss criteria that might be used to adjudicate which is the best among rival explanations.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 878-900 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Oxford Journal of Legal Studies |
Volume | 39 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 22 Aug 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2019 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- legal argumentation
- inference to the best explanation
- legal abduction
- legal principle
- inferential forms
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Claudio Michelon
- School of Law - Personal Chair of Philosophy of Law
- Edinburgh Centre for Legal Theory
- Edinburgh Centre for Private Law
Person: Academic: Research Active