The Mismeasure of the Self: The Mismeasure of the Self, by Alessandra Tanesini. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. x + 230

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Abstract / Description of output

Successfully engaging in epistemic activities—inquiry (by oneself or as part of a group), inference, swapping knowledge via testimony, resolving disagreements with epistemic peers, superiors, and inferiors, and so on—requires having the measure of one’s self. In particular, it requires sensitivity to what one already knows and does not know, the trustworthiness of one’s intellectual faculties, the extent of one’s immunity or vulnerability to being swayed by biases (whether idiosyncratic or widespread), and one’s status and reputation as an expert, as a reliable source, or as a liar or fool. Those with miscalibrated senses of their own knowledge, intellectual capacities, and relative position and status within their epistemic community are liable to miss out both on epistemic goods and on opportunities for self-improvement, and are prone to mislead others, harming not just themselves, but wronging those around them and their epistemic community more generally.
Original languageEnglish
Article numberfzac058
Number of pages7
JournalMind
Early online date13 Dec 2022
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 13 Dec 2022

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