The predicative predicament

Anders J. Schoubye

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

The-Predicativism is the view that names are count nouns. For example, the meaning of the name ‘Louise’ is roughly the property of being called Louise. Moreover, proponents of this view maintain that names that are ostensibly in argument position of a predicate are covert definite descriptions. In recent years, The-Predicativism has acquired a number of new supporters, mainly Elbourne (2005), Matushansky (2008), and Fara (2015b). And while it was pointed out by Kripke (1980) that these kinds of views generally struggle with capturing the rigidity of proper names, these new views are alleged to solve this problem. In this paper I argue that the more recent versions of the view continue to struggle. In particular, I show that the views fail to provide an explanatory and/or empirically adequate analysis of rigidity. My discussions of these views are then supplemented with a general diagnosis of the problem and an explanation of why it is unlikely to be solved by The-Predicativism.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)571-595
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Issue number3
Early online date7 Nov 2016
Publication statusPublished - 31 May 2018


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