The proper work of the intellect

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Abstract

There is a familiar teleological picture of epistemic normativity on which it is grounded in the goal or good of belief, which is taken in turn to be the acquisition of truth and the avoidance of error. This traditional picture has faced numerous challenges, but one of the most interesting of these is an argument that rests on the nearly universally accepted view that this truth goal, as it is known, is at heart two distinct goals that are in tension with one another. This paper will look more closely at the standard way of understanding the truth goal, drawing out both its explicit and implicit features. My aim will be to show that the standard way of understanding the truth goal is deeply mistaken, to propose and defend an alternative model, and to show how this alternative model restores the unity of the goal and its potential to ground and explain the normative dimensions of belief.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)22-40
JournalJournal of the American Philosophical Association
Volume5
Issue number1
Early online date1 Apr 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2019

Keywords

  • epistemic normativity
  • epistemic value
  • veritism
  • truth consequentialism
  • virtue epistemology

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