@inbook{0a5ddcd8f9d341279f4b3fb3f1b273ce,
title = "The reality of the non-existent object of thought: The possible, the impossible, and mental existence in Islamic philosophy (eleventh–thirteenth centuries)",
abstract = "One of the most widespread claims combining epistemology and metaphysics in post-Avicennian Islamic philosophy was that every object of thought is real. In Muʿtazilite reading, it was endorsed due to a theory of knowledge which states that knowledge is a connection or relation between the knower and the object known. Avicennists accepted it due to the rule that in a proposition “s is p” if p is something positive s has to be positive and real too. Hence, insofar as one can conceptually distinguish between two non-existent items, they have to be real. In this article, the author presents significant consequences of this theory: the acceptance and denial of non-existent yet real extramental objects; the concept of mental existence as an alternative solution; the conceivability of paraconsistent ideas and their reality or reducibility to some real objects.",
keywords = "non-existent objects, intentionality, mental existence, paraconsistency, Muʿtazilites, Avicenna, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Ibn al-Malāḥimī",
author = "Fedor Benevich",
year = "2018",
month = aug,
day = "16",
doi = "10.1093/oso/9780198827030.003.0002",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780198827030",
volume = "6",
series = "Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
pages = "1--34",
editor = "Robert Pasnau",
booktitle = "Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy",
address = "United States",
}