The Regulator: The First Decade of the Electoral Commission

As with many demo cratic devices, party finance super visory bodies (PFSBs)1 come in a long array of shapes and sizes, something that can easily be lost on those who study only one or very sim ilar such bodies. For example, a UK scholar with some know ledge of the US Federal Election Commission might be forgiven for assuming that all PFSBs are unified entities overseeing the range of party and cam paign finance laws and practices, their supervision, monitoring and enforcement. In many jurisdictions, how ever, these tasks are shared between two or more institutions, owing to consti tu tional or other institutional ar range ments. In Lithu- ania the functional roles of PFSBs are shared between the Central Election Com- mission and State Tax inspectorate, in Croatia between the State Audit Office and tax administration, and in Albania the elect oral commission, tax authorities and State Supreme Audit are all involved. In ab stracto the unified model - as in France, Ger many, Belgium and Poland - may be thought pre fer able in affording the super visory body with an overall view of the finances of can did ates and par- ties, better in forma tion and avoidance of the co ordination and coopera tion dif- ficult ies that may afflict inter- agency relations.2.