The role of marriage in fighting HIV: A quantitative illustration for Malawi

Jeremy Greenwood; Philipp Kircher; Cezar Santos; Michèle Tertilt

doi:10.1257/aer.p20171056

The role of marriage in fighting HIV: A quantitative illustration for Malawi

Jeremy Greenwood, Philipp Kircher, Cezar Santos, Michèle Tertilt

School of Economics

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Abstract

How might policies that promote marriage and/or dissuade divorce help in the fight against HIV/AIDS? This question is addressed employing a choice-theoretic general equilibrium search model, using Malawi as a case study. In the framework developed, individuals can choose between married and single life. A single person can select among abstinence and sex with or without a condom. The results suggest that marriage-friendly policies can help to abate HIV/AIDS. The policy predictions that obtain from general equilibrium analysis are compared with those that arise from simulated synthetic field experiments and epidemiological studies.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	158-162
Number of pages	5
Journal	American Economic Review
Volume	107
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171056
Publication status	Published - 1 May 2017

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10.1257/aer.p20171056

GreenwoodEtalAER2017TheRoleOfMarriage
Copyright © 2017 AEA Greenwood, Jeremy, Philipp Kircher, Cezar Santos, and Michèle Tertilt. 2017. "The Role of Marriage in Fighting HIV: A Quantitative Illustration for Malawi." American Economic Review, 107(5): 158-62. Published in final form at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20171056
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The role of marriage in fighting HIV: A quantitative illustration for Malawi

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