@techreport{8de9c237f4c44033bb0d76addad3b397,
title = "The spillover effects of monitoring: A field experiment",
abstract = "We provide …field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring ina context where productivity is multi-dimensional and only one dimensionis monitored and incentivised. We hire students to do a job for us. Thejob consists of identifying euro coins. We study the effects of monitoringand penalising mistakes on work quality, and evaluate spillovers on non-incentivised dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We …findthat monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are large, butreduces punctuality substantially irrespectively of the size of incentives.Monitoring does not affect theft, with ten per cent of participants stealingoverall. Our setting also allows us to disentangle between possible theoretical mechanisms driving the adverse effects of monitoring. Our …fiindingsare supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate forbeing distrusted.",
keywords = "counterproductive behaviour, monitoring, experiment, C93, J24, J30, M42, M52",
author = "Michele Belot and Marina Schr{\"o}der",
year = "2013",
month = oct,
day = "28",
language = "English",
series = "ESE Discussion Papers",
publisher = "Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series",
number = "238",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series",
}