The Strategic Equivalence of Games with Unawareness

Tomohiro Hoshi, Alistair Isaac

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

Abstract / Description of output

An equivalence relation is more transparent when complemented by an
explicit specification of the set of transformations under which equivalence
is preserved. In the case of extensive games equivalent with respect to
their strategic normal form, the set of transformations was provided by
Thompson (1952). We extend Thompson’s result to the case of games with
unawareness (Feinberg (2009))
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLogic and the Interactive Rationality
EditorsD Grossi, L Kurzen, F.R Velazquez-Quesada
PublisherInstitute for Logic Language and Computation
Pages203-225
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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