The valuation effects of investor attention in stock-financed acquisitions

Samer Adra*, Leonidas G. Barbopoulos

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Limited investor attention allows overvalued companies to engage in stock-financed acquisitions of listed target firms without experiencing significant reductions in existing valuations. Our robust findings show that overvalued stock-paying acquirers that are subject to limited investor attention do not experience significant announcement period wealth losses. However, the overvaluation of these acquirers is corrected in the post-announcement period. By contrast, the overvalued acquirers that receive high investor attention and use stock as the payment method in their listed target acquisitions experience negative announcement period abnormal returns. The widely documented evidence that stock-financed acquisitions are associated with significant announcement period wealth losses is primarily driven by deals in which the acquirers are subject to high investor attention. Crown Copyright © 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)108-125
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Empirical Finance
Early online date19 Oct 2017
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2018

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • investor attention
  • corporate takeovers
  • payment method
  • acquirer abnormal returns
  • volume return premium
  • propensity score
  • earnings announcements
  • matching estimators
  • market
  • firms
  • inattention
  • information
  • decisions
  • payment


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