This is the bad case: What brains in vats can know

Aidan McGlynn

doi:10.1093/arisup/aky011

This is the bad case: What brains in vats can know

Aidan McGlynn

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

The orthodox position in epistemology, for both externalists and internalists, is that a subject in a ‘bad case’—a sceptical scenario—is so epistemically badly off that they cannot know how badly off they are. Ofra Magidor (2018) contends that externalists should break ranks on this question, and that doing so is liberating when it comes time to confront a number of central issues in epistemology, including scepticism and the new evil demon problem for process reliabilism. In this reply, I will question whether Magidor’s argument should persuade externalists, whether it really engages with the orthodox view on what subjects in bad cases can know, and whether the dispute is, as Magidor insists, a significant one for contemporary epistemology.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	183-205
Journal	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Volume	92
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/aky011
Publication status	Published - 4 Jun 2018

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McGlynnPAS2018ThisIsTheBadCase
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume following peer review. The version of record Aidan McGlynn; II—‘This Is the Bad Case’: What Brains in Vats Can Know, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 2018, Pages 183–205 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/aristoteliansupp/article/92/1/183/5032739.
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This is the bad case: What brains in vats can know

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