TY - GEN
T1 - Toward a coherent account of moral agency
AU - Tollon, Fabio
N1 - /
PY - 2019/12
Y1 - 2019/12
N2 - Johnson and Noorman's (2014) account of agency provides us with an understanding of how we may have agents without mental states, and therefore gives a more nuanced account of the moral roles that Artificial Agents (AAs) may perform. However, this account only provides a truncated understanding of the potential for Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs). In order for an entity to be considered a real moral agent, on their account, it must still have some form of intentionality, and it is the specific sense of intentionality argued for by Johnson (2006) that I claim is at issue.
AB - Johnson and Noorman's (2014) account of agency provides us with an understanding of how we may have agents without mental states, and therefore gives a more nuanced account of the moral roles that Artificial Agents (AAs) may perform. However, this account only provides a truncated understanding of the potential for Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs). In order for an entity to be considered a real moral agent, on their account, it must still have some form of intentionality, and it is the specific sense of intentionality argued for by Johnson (2006) that I claim is at issue.
UR - https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2540/
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - CEUR Workshop Proceedings
BT - Proceedings of the South African Forum for Artificial Intelligence Research
A2 - Davel, Marelie
A2 - Barnard, Etienne
PB - CEUR Workshop Proceedings (CEUR-WS.org)
T2 - South African Forum for Artificial Intelligence Research
Y2 - 4 December 2019 through 6 December 2019
ER -