Toward Provenance-Based Security for Configuration Languages

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Large system installations are increasingly configured using high-level, mostly-declarative languages. Often, different users contribute data that is compiled centrally and distributed to individual systems. Although the systems themselves have been developed with reliability and availability in mind, the configuration compilation process can lead to unforeseen vulnerabilities because of the lack of access control on the different components combined to build the final configuration. Even if simple change-based access controls are applied to validate changes to the final version, changes can be lost or incorrectly attributed. Based on the growing literature on provenance for database queries and other models of computation, we identify a potential application area for provenance to securing configuration languages.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe 4th Usenix Workshop on the Theory and Practice of Provenance
Number of pages4
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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