Abstract
This article employs a cross-level approach to explain cooperation in transatlantic competition policy. The explanation reveals the important role of regulators as interfaces between the domestic and international levels of analysis. Economic internationalization is a system-level cause of this cooperation, the precise effect of which is accounted for by an intervening variable (domestic politics), which is simplified with a principal-agent model. The negotiations over the 1991 EU-US Bilateral Competition Agreement suggest that, while regulators remain constrained by domestic institutions, they play an important role in explaining why the formal, transatlantic cooperative framework is largely a discretionary one created by a non-treaty international agreement.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 171-196 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | European Journal of International Relations |
Volume | 12 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2006 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- competition policy
- cross-level analysis
- discretionary cooperation
- international cooperation
- principal-agent model
- regulation
- transatlantic relations
- two-level game