It is common to think of the attitude of trust as involving reliance of some sort. For example, Annette Baier (1986) argues that trust is reliance on the good will of others, and Richard Holton (1994) argues that trust is reliance from a participant stance. However, it is puzzling how trust could involve reliance, because reliance, unlike trust, is responsive to practical reasons: we rely in light of reasons that show it worthwhile to rely, but we don’t trust in light of reasons that show it worthwhile to trust. To address the puzzle, I sketch an account of reliance, according to which reliance consists in action, and I sketch an account of trust, according to which trust consists in belief held from a participant stance. I conclude that it is plausible to see trust as the grounds for reliance.
|Publication status||Published - 1 Aug 2017|
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- School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences - Senior Lecturer In Philosophy
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