Two projects for understanding the mind: A response to Morris and Richardson

N Chater, M Pickering

Research output: Contribution to journalEditorialpeer-review

Abstract

We respond to Morris and Richardson's (1995) claim that Pickering and Chater's (1995) arguments about the lack of a relation between cognitive science and folk psychology are flawed. We note that possible controversies about the appropriate uses for the two terms do not affect our arguments. We then address their claim that computational explanation of knowledge-rich processes has proved possible in the domains of problem solving, scientific discovery, and reasoning. We argue that, in all cases, computational explanation is only possible for aspects of those processes that do not make reference to general knowledge. We conclude that consideration of the issues raised by Morris and Richardson reinforces our original claim that there are two fundamentally distinct projects for understanding the mind, one based on justification, and the other on computational explanation, and that these apply to non-overlapping aspects of mental life.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)553-569
Number of pages17
JournalMinds and machines
Volume7
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Nov 1997

Keywords

  • Folk psychology
  • cognitive science
  • justifications
  • causes
  • computation
  • knowledge-free
  • knowledge-rich
  • problem solving
  • scientific discovery
  • reasoning
  • SELECTION TASK
  • COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE
  • FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
  • INFORMATION
  • SCIENCE
  • CHATER
  • MEMORY
  • CHESS

Cite this