Understanding friendship

Michel Croce, Matt Jope

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

This article takes issue with two prominent views in the current debate around epistemic partiality in friendship. Strong views of epistemic partiality hold that friendship may require biased beliefs in direct conflict with epistemic norms. Weak views hold that friendship may place normative expectations on belief formation but in a manner that does not violate these norms. It is argued that neither view succeeds in explaining the relationship between epistemic norms and friendship norms. Weak views inadvertently endorse a form of motivated reasoning, failing to resolve the normative clash they seek to avoid. Strong views turn out to be incoherent once we consider the question of whether the requirement to form an epistemically partial belief is independent of whether the belief in question would be true. It is then argued that an epistemology of friendship should recognise the special role that understanding plays in friendship. On this view, friendship normatively requires understanding the truth about our friends. This entails that epistemic partiality, far from being a requirement, is in fact at odds with good friendship.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)371-386
JournalPhilosophical Issues
Volume34
Issue number1
Early online date21 Oct 2024
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2024

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • friendship
  • norms of belief
  • epistemic partiality
  • permissivism
  • understanding

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