Unity and conflict: Explaining financial industry lobbying success in European Union public consultations

Adam W. Chalmers*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

This article examines the contingent nature of financial industry lobbying power in the context of the policy formation stage of six European Commission regulatory proposals. I argue that lobbying success is a function of how well finance is able to speak with a unified voice. Building on existing studies, I examine industry unity as explicit preference alignment between actors but also in terms of actors abstaining from stating preferences. Staying silent on an issue sends signals to policymakers about issue saliency and industry support. Using a novel dataset derived from document coding and interviews, I examine the impact of industry unity on lobbying success in shaping six financial regulatory proposals in the context of the European Union. My findings show that lobbying success is partially contingent on the extent to which finance is united behind a common position. Critically, however, lobbying success is also related to the nature of that position, whether supporting the proposal or whether in favor of strengthening or weakening regulatory stringency.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)391-408
Number of pages18
JournalRegulation and Governance
Issue number3
Early online date26 Nov 2018
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2020

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • European Union
  • financial industry lobbying
  • financial regulation
  • lobbying success


Dive into the research topics of 'Unity and conflict: Explaining financial industry lobbying success in European Union public consultations'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this