Unmaking the Chinese Nationalist State: Administrative Reform among Fiscal Collapse, 1937-1945

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

The defeat of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 is often explained as a consequence of Nationalist fiscal incompetence during the Second Sino-Japanese War, which led to the collapse of the Nationalist state. In this paper, I argue that from 1937 until 1940, GMD fiscal policy managed to preserve a degree of relative stability even though, by early 1939, the Nationalists had already lost control over ports yielding 80 per cent of Customs revenue which, during the Nanjing decade (1928-1937), had accounted for more than 40 per cent of annual central government revenue. The loss of this revenue forced the Nationalists to introduce wartime fiscal instruments, taxation in kind, and transit taxes, both previously condemned as outdated and inequitable by the Nationalists. Further territorial losses led to the introduction of deficit financing, which in turn became a cause of hyperinflation. The introduction of war-time fiscal instruments led to administrative changes in the revenue-collecting agencies of the Nationalist state, and to the demise of the Maritime Customs Service as the pre-eminent revenue-collecting and anti-smuggling organization. The administrative upheavals of the war facilitated the

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)277-301
Number of pages25
JournalModern Asian Studies
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2011


Dive into the research topics of 'Unmaking the Chinese Nationalist State: Administrative Reform among Fiscal Collapse, 1937-1945'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this