Abstract
Hume seems committed to an inconsistent triad: (i) we believe certain things to exist unperceived; (ii) if we believe a certain thing to exist unperceived, then we have (at our disposal) an idea that represents it as existing unperceived; and (iii) we do not have (at our disposal) an idea that represents anything as existing unperceived. This chapter aims to acquit him of this seeming inconsistency by arguing that, contrary to what others have claimed, Hume does not explicitly argue for (iii); his theory of mental representation does not implicitly commit him to (iii); and, moreover, this theory allows him to explain our having ideas that represent things as existing unperceived, contrary to (iii). To this end, the chapter offers Hume an account of negation modeled on his accounts of abstract ideas and ideas of substances and modes.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy |
| Editors | Donald Rutherford |
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Chapter | 6 |
| Pages | 167-213 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Edition | 1st |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191886911 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780198852452 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2019 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- David Hume
- continued existence
- distinct existence
- belief
- copy principle
- impressions
- ideas
- mental representation
- negation