Varieties of Externalism: Epistemic, content, vehicle

J. Adam Carter*, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palennos, Duncan Pritchard

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalEditorialpeer-review


Introduction to Special Issue of American Philosophical Quarterly.
Some of the most prominent strands of thinking in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind and cognitive science are developed under the banner of "externalism." Epistemologists typically embrace "externalism" by way of denying some version of "internalism" about epistemic justification that is, by denying that what epistemically justifies a belief supervenes (entirely) on one's mental states (mentalism) or, alternatively, is accessible by reflection alone (accessibilism). Already, though, different kinds of externalism with their distinct sources of philosophical motivation outside of epistemology have become entangled with one another.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)II-II
Number of pages1
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2016


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  • Extended Knowledge

    Pritchard, D., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Carter, J. A. & Palermos, S. O.



    Project: Research

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