Voting with preference intensities

Anson Kahng, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract / Description of output

When an agent votes, she typically ranks the set of available alternatives. Occasionally, she may also wish to report the intensity of her preferences by indicating adjacent pairs of alternatives in her ranking between which her preference is acutely decisive; for instance, she may suggest that she likes alternative a more than b, but b much more than c. We design near-optimal voting rules which aggregate such preference rankings with intensities using the recently-popular distortion framework. We also show that traditional voting rules, which aggregate preference rankings while ignoring (or not eliciting) intensities, can incur significant welfare loss.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
EditorsBrian Williams, Yiling Chen, Jennifer Neville
PublisherAAAI Press
Pages5697-5704
Number of pages8
Volume37
Edition5
ISBN (Electronic)9781577358800
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 26 Jun 2023
EventThe 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Walter E. Washington Convention Center, Washington, United States
Duration: 7 Feb 202314 Feb 2023
https://aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI-23/

Publication series

NameProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
PublisherAAAI Press
ISSN (Print)2159-5399
ISSN (Electronic)2374-3468

Conference

ConferenceThe 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Abbreviated titleAAAI-23
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityWashington
Period7/02/2314/02/23
Internet address

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • GTEP
  • social choice
  • social voting

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