Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-Unit Markets

Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract / Description of output

In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept that retain its desirable fairness properties do exist. We study the dynamics of (Walrasian) envy-free pricing mechanisms in this environment, showing that for any such pricing mechanism, the best response dynamic starting from truth-telling converges to a pure Nash equilibrium with small loss in revenue and welfare. Moreover, we generalize these bounds to capture all the (reasonable) Nash equilibria for a large class of (monotone) pricing mechanisms. We also identify a natural mechanism, which selects the minimum Walrasian envy-free price, in which for n=2 buyers the best response dynamic converges from any starting profile. We conjecture convergence of the mechanism for any number of buyers and provide simulation results to support our conjecture.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2019
Place of PublicationPalo Alto, California, USA
PublisherAAAI Press
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-57735-809-1
Publication statusPublished - 17 Jul 2019
EventThe Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, United States
Duration: 27 Jan 20191 Feb 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
PublisherAAAI Press
ISSN (Print)2159-5399
ISSN (Electronic)2374-3468


ConferenceThe Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Abbreviated titleAAAI 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityHonolulu, Hawaii
Internet address


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