Where’s the 'e' in constitution? A European puzzle

Why have the constitutions of capitalist states traditionally paid limited regard to the economy, and why has the European Union ‘constitution’ accorded the economy a more prominent role? We address this question by reference to the variable prevalence of different models of the place of economics in constitutional thought and practice at the two sites. An influential early model treats the economic dimension as a derivative feature of the predominantly political constitution of the state, explaining both the low visibility of economics in the state constitution and the lower visibility of constitutionalism in the economy-centred supranational project. Beyond the derivative model, economic constitutionalism may be understood in constitutive terms, or as a sectoral, constructed, prior or supplantive feature. These alternative models, in shifting combination, supply a better factual account of EU economic constitutionalism, but do not necessarily defeat the normative case for the adaptation of a fuller political constitutionalism to the requirements of the EU.