Wittgenstein’s On Certainty as pyrrhonism in action

Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

I want to suggest a way of approaching On Certainty that treats what Wittgenstein is doing in the notebooks that make up this work as manifesting a kind philosophical practice that is broadly Pyrrhonian, at least on one reading of what this involves. Such a reading fits with the general philosophical quietism found in Wittgenstein’s work, particularly in his later writings, and is also supported by independent textual evidence that he was profoundly influenced by Pyrrhonian scepticism. Crucially, however, it also helps to clarify the sense in which the Pyrrhonian sceptical techniques, and hence (I claim) the kind of philosophical quietism that goes along with them, can have an essentially disquieting effect on the subject (which in the sceptical case I dub epistemic vertigo).
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationWittgensteinian (adj.)
Subtitle of host publicationLooking at Things From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy
EditorsS. Wuppuluri, N. Da Costa
ISBN (Electronic)9783030275693
ISBN (Print) 9783030275686
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 23 Nov 2019

Publication series

NameThe Frontiers Collection


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