Wright contra McDowell on perceptual knowledge and scepticism

D. Pritchard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

One of the key debates in contemporary epistemology is that between Crispin Wright and John McDowell on the topic of radical scepticism. Whereas both of them endorse a form of epistemic internalism, the very different internalist conceptions of perceptual knowledge that they offer lead them to draw radically different conclusions when it comes to the sceptical problem. The aim of this paper is to maintain that McDowell’s view, at least when suitably supplemented with further argumentation (argumentation that he may or may not agree with), can be shown to be a viable alternative to Wright’s anti-sceptical proposal, one that retains the driving motivation behind Wright’s proposal while avoiding one of its most fundamental problems. Wright’s wholesale rejection of the McDowellian anti-sceptical strategy is thus premature.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)467-479
Number of pages13
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2009

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • discrimination
  • epistemology
  • reasons
  • scepticism
  • epistemis externalism/internalism distinction


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