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Diachronic norms for self-locating credences

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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)709-738
JournalErgo
Volume4
Issue number25
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 31 Dec 2017

Abstract

How should rational beliefs change over time? The standard Bayesian answer is: by conditionalization (a.k.a. Bayes’ Rule). But conditionalization is not an adequate rule for updating beliefs in “centred” propositions whose truth-value may change over time. In response, some have suggested that the objects of belief must be uncentred; others have suggested that beliefs in centred propositions are not subject to diachronic norms. I argue that these views do not offer a satisfactory account of self-locating beliefs and their dynamics. A third response is to replace conditionalization by a new norm that can deal with centred propositions. I critically survey a number of new norms that have been proposed, and defend one particular approach.

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