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Do banks audited by specialists engage in less real activities management? Evidence from repurchase agreements

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Do banks audited by specialists engage in less real activities management? Evidence from repurchase agreements. / Fargher, Neil; Hou, Wenxuan; Zhang, Ziyang.

In: Auditing, A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 38, No. 1, 28.02.2019, p. 149-169.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Fargher, N, Hou, W & Zhang, Z 2019, 'Do banks audited by specialists engage in less real activities management? Evidence from repurchase agreements', Auditing, A Journal of Practice and Theory, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 149-169. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-52017

APA

Fargher, N., Hou, W., & Zhang, Z. (2019). Do banks audited by specialists engage in less real activities management? Evidence from repurchase agreements. Auditing, A Journal of Practice and Theory, 38(1), 149-169. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-52017

Vancouver

Fargher N, Hou W, Zhang Z. Do banks audited by specialists engage in less real activities management? Evidence from repurchase agreements. Auditing, A Journal of Practice and Theory. 2019 Feb 28;38(1):149-169. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-52017

Author

Fargher, Neil ; Hou, Wenxuan ; Zhang, Ziyang. / Do banks audited by specialists engage in less real activities management? Evidence from repurchase agreements. In: Auditing, A Journal of Practice and Theory. 2019 ; Vol. 38, No. 1. pp. 149-169.