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Four kinds of perspectival truth

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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)342-359
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume96
Issue number2
Early online date10 Jun 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2018

Abstract

In this paper, I assess recent claims in philosophy of science about scientific perspectivism being compatible with realism. I clarify the rationale for scientific perspectivism and the problems and challenges that perspectivism faces in delivering a form of realism. In particular, I concentrate my attention on truth, and on ways in which truth can be understood in perspectival terms. I offer a cost -benefit analysis of each of them and defend a version that in my view is most promising in living up to realist expectations

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