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    Rights statement: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in The Philosophical Quarterly following peer review. The version of record Jens Christian Bjerring, Wolfgang Schwarz; Granularity Problems. Philos Q 2017; 67 (266): 22-37 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqw028

    Accepted author manuscript, 241 KB, PDF-document

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)22-37
Number of pages16
JournalThe Philosophical Quarterly
Volume67
Issue number266
Early online date4 Apr 2016
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 4 Apr 2016

Abstract

Possible-worlds accounts of mental or linguistic content are often criticized for being too coarse-grained. To make room for more fine-grained distinctions among contents, several authors have recently proposed extending the space of possible worlds by ‘impossible worlds’. We argue that this strategy comes with serious costs: we would effectively have to abandon most of the features that make the possible-worlds framework attractive. More generally, we argue that while there are intuitive and theoretical considerations against overly coarse-grained notions of content, the same kinds of considerations also prohibit an overly fine-grained individuation of content. An adequate notion of content, it seems, should have intermediate granularity. However, it is hard to construe a notion of content that meets these demands. Any notion of content, we suggest, must be either implausibly coarse-grained or implausibly fine-grained (or both).

    Research areas

  • possible-worlds semantics, impossible worlds, hyperintensionality, content, meaning, proposition

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